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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Dale Carter Shackelford (Shackelford) submits this Appellant's Reply Brief (Reply), prose. To
the extent Shackelford has failed to present this Reply in a traditional format, or if it is not clear as to
which reply applies to which claim, Shackelford states that each and every claim contained herein
applies to every claim within the Initial Brief of Appellant (Brief), and to those arguments made by the
Respondent.
On September 22, 2015, this Court took Judicial Notice of the records/transcripts in Appellant's
prior appeals: State v. Shackelford, Supreme Court Docket No. 27966; Shackelford v. State, Supreme
Court Docket No. 31928 and State v. Shackelford, Supreme Court Docket No. 39398. Shackelford has,
in every instance possible, referenced documents by the appropriate record and/or page number(s).
To the extent Shackelford (as the state asserts) has not clearly raised as a claim within his Brief
all claims contained within his Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (December 6, 2013
amendment), Shackelford does so now and here again, and for clarity of the record, includes those facts
below in support thereof.
Finally, the state implies within their Brief of Respondent that counsel appointed to represent
Shackelford on this appeal moved to withdraw from the case on the basis that the claims within are
"patently frivolous" (Brief of Respondent, pg. 40). Short of the state having been privy to confidential
attorney/client communications, the state could not possibly have ascertained the "why" of counsel's
withdrawal from the case, and such unfounded accusations by Mr. Anderson are both unwarranted and
inaccurate.

iii

APPELLANT'S REPLY TO STATE'S ARGUMENTS
The state implies throughout their Brief of Respondent that Shackelford failed to address
the plural (alternative) rationale of the district court in dismissing various claims within the
petition for post-conviction relief. (i.e., I.C.§ 19-4908; res judicata). The state also asserts that
Shackelford has not raised ineffective assistance of counsel claims regarding post-conviction and
appellate counsel within the prose Initial Brief of Petitioner (Brief) which were raised within the
amended petition for post-conviction relief (2011-2013 version / December 6, 2013 amendment) 1
upon which this appeal is based. (Respondent's Brief at pg. 7.)
The state's implication that Shackelford failed to address alternative theories of the district
court in dismissing claims is inaccurate. In addressing - individually - the district court's primary
theories (res judicata) and the issue of claims said not to have been raised within the proceedings
(I.C. § 19-4908), Shackelford specifically argued that post-conviction and appellate counsel failed
to investigate (thus raise) claims (Brief, pg. 2). Shackelford also generally identified ineffective
assistance of counsel as cause for failure to present claims in prior proceedings: "Shackelford

avers that in those claims presented, trial, post-conviction and appellate counsel severed the
principle-agent relationship by.failing to include, research and/or investigate claims for inclusion
in the petition for post-conviction relief ... " Brief of Appellant, pg. 38. Shackelford individualized
even more specific arguments regarding this matter at pages 35 - 37 of the Brief
In his Brief, as well as in the underlying petition for post-conviction relief (2011-2013),
Shackelford presented matters which, if Respondent's argument regarding issue and/or claim

The state stipulated to, and the district court granted Shackelford's motion to amend the 2011
version of the petition for post-conviction relief filed as Latah County Case No. CV2001-4272
(#42182, Tr., p. 28, ln 15 - p. 31, In 11 ).

preclusion carry any weight whatsoever, provide cause for this Court to review the claims on the
basis of ineffective assistance of counsel during post-conviction proceedings (2001-2013) where,
as a capital case petitioner, Shackelford had a right to appointment to, and effective assistance of
counsel in his initial-review proceeding (Idaho Criminal Rule 44.2). This is clear in that the
March 18, 2011 petition (as well as its 2001 ancestor) was filed before the states' notice that they
would not seek an sentence of death on resentencing. (#39398, ppg. 14-20: Claim G, Brief).
Indeed, Shackelford 's ineffective assistance of counsel claims are to be believed due not
only to the verified affidavit on file in the post-conviction petition application; post-conviction
counsel made representations to Shackelford (and the district court) ON THE RECORD - a
record of which this Court has taken judicial notice in this appeal.
In open court, the (actual) State Appellate Public Defender (now the Honorable Third
Judicial District Judge) Molly Huskey had the following colloquy with the court:
THE COURT: Well, we're now back to the merits as opposed to the process. I
understand your objections to the merits, what I'm trying to grapple with is the
process. Can Mr. Shackelford orally ask me for permission to appeal?
MS. HUSKEY: No your Honor, because he is represented by counsel and that
counsel is us. And we would be the parties to request the interlocutory appeal on his
behalf
THE COURT: And then that begs the question, Ms. Huskey, that takes us to how
can he bring an appeal under Rule 11 if you control his right to appeal?
MS. HUSKEY: He has two options, your Honor. One, bring -- he can bring -simply because we don't believe that he has the ability to control the issues in this
review does not mean necessarily that that would not be an issue we potentially
could include in his appeal.
Secondly, your Honor, he always has the option of filing a second postconviction petition articulating that his claims were not fully and fairly litigated by
appellate counsel. That's a fairly common right that is given to defendants and one
we see fairly frequently.
Transcript - Telephonic Hearing; March 08, 2004 (#31928/27966, Tr., ppg. 293-94).
2

Counsel clearly represented to both Shackelford and the court that the issues not presented
within Shackelford's (2001) petition for post-conviction relief would be allowed in a second
petition for post-conviction relief. While Shackelford maintains that the 2011-2013 filing of the
petition under case number CV-2001-4272 was nothing more than a misnamed supplement /
amendment to the 2001 petition as argued infra, assuming arguendo this court were to rule
otherwise, a sufficient reason exception to any procedural default of a claim not raised by postconviction counsel should be granted based on ineffective assistance of counsel in an initialreview proceeding. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012).
As recognized in Clemmons v. Delo, 124 F.3d 944 (8 th Cir. 1997), if counsel refuses to
include a claim requested by a petitioner, and the petitioner then moves for leave to file a
supplemental brief prose, asserting the claim, a subsequent (state) default for failing to raise the
claim may be excused for purposes of federal habeas proceedings 2
At resentencing in Latah County Case No. CR-00-00260 on September 28, 2011,
Shackelford had argued, by and through counsel, that any sentence imposed by the court greater
than ten (10) years to life (with the possibility of parole) without a finding by a jury of specific
facts would deny Shackelford due process of law (#39398, ppg. 36 - 42; ppg. 99 - 100 ) in that
the state had sought a sentence of death, and that Shackelford's conviction had come about prior
to any effort of the state to withdraw its Notice to Seek a Sentence of Death. I.C. § I 8-4004A. As

2 In a footnote within the MOTION TO RECONSIDER ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
FILE SECOND ADDENDUM TO THIRD AMENDED PETITION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF, (#39398, p. 3446, n. 1) counsel suggested to the district court: "Yet

another outcome is that Petitioner's claims will subsequently be heard in federal habeas
because Petitioner has attempted to raise the claim in state court during initial postconviction proceedings; such outcome would result in unnecessary delay. "
3

such, Shackelford maintains the rights of a capital case defendant, requiring a Jury to
unanimously find the existence of a statutory aggrevator before any sentence greater that life
(with the possibility of parole) can be pronounced (I.C. §19-2515 et. seq.) in that the state did not
withdraw the notice prior to the original sentencing (l.C. § 18-4004A).
On appeal from resentencing, counsel from the Capital Litigation Unit of the State
Appellate Public Defender's Office (SAPD) was appointed to represent Shackelford. Shackelford
requested counsel to include the arguments raised and preserved in the district court (described
above) in the direct appeal from sentencing. Not until Shackelford received a copy of the final
(Amended) Brief of Appellant in Idaho Supreme Court Docket No. 39398-2011 was Shackelford
made aware that the claim had not been raised by counsel as requested.

On May 31, 2012, Shackelford filed a timely pro se MOTION TO AUGMENT
(AMENDED) BRIEF OF APPELLANT in Docket No. 39398-2011 (Opinion: State v.

Shackelford, 155 Idaho 454, 314 P.3d 136 (2013) (Shackelford II), along with the proposed
augmentation (claim), and the state filed a response (objection) to the prose motion. On June 20,
2012, this Court, without hearing or opinion, denied the motion. This claim was then presented
within Latah County Case No. CV-2001-4272 as Claim F, denied by the district court, and
appealed in the instant case (Claim F). The state argues both res judicata and collateral estoppel
as a defense.
In 2003, Shackelford moved the district court via a pro se Motion for Declaratory
Judgment for permission to file claims (himself) which had gone uninvestigated by postconviction counsel (Brief, ppg. 1-2) (#31928 - p. 410). After several hearings and opposition by
both the SAPD and the state, the district court ordered that Shackelford was not to file pro se
4

motions (et. al.) while represented by counsel, in part due to the representations made to the court
and Shackelford - in open court by the SAPD - that all claims not raised by counsel could be
raised in a second post-conviction petition (see March 8, 2004 Telephonic Hearing transcripts -

supra). Shackelford sought and was denied permission to file an interlocutory appeal (id at page
291,295), with the court sustaining the objections of the (actual) State Appellate Public Defender
(now the Honorable Third Judicial District Judge) Molly Huskey. Shackelford then filed a Notice
of Appeal (of Right) to this Court on March 24, 2004 (#31928, pg. 1624) which was summarily
denied (#31928, p. 1715). (An interlocutory decision or order, not made appealable by statute, is
not appealable, and may be reviewed by the supreme court only on appeal from final judgment.
LC.§ 19-4909; Pulver v. State, 92 Idaho 627, 448 P.2d 241 (1968)).
In Clemmons, the Eighth Circuit held that the petitioner had fairly presented his claim to
the state courts, and thus, there was no procedural default of the claim. The Court noted that the
petitioner "did the only thing he could do: he tried to bring the issue to the attention of the
Missouri Supreme Court himself.'' Clemmons at 948.
In Smith v. Baldwin, 510 F. 3d 1127 (9 th Cir. 2007) (en bane), the Court held that although
post-conviction counsel was allegedly ineffective in not properly litigating petitioner's Brady
claim 3 in state proceedings, the alleged errors did not prevent petitioner from thereafter raising his
substantive post-conviction claims with the state appellate courts. Smith at 1146-47. In Custer v.

Hill, 378 F.3d 968 (9t1 Cir. 2004) the Court indicated that the claims must be presented to the
1

state's supreme court ... "the court in which the issue must be raised to be preserved." Custer at
974-75. Shackelford has and continues to raise his claims at each and every level - claims
abandoned by appointed counsel, claims filed late by appointed counsel and claims simply
3 Brady v. Mmyland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963)

5

forgotten by the courts in the procedural conundrum which is this case.
On February 9, 2005, nearly two (2) years after Shackelford filed the Motion for
Declaratory Judgment (supra), SAPD counsel filed a MOTION TO FILE A SECOND
ADDENDUM TO THIRD AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF with
attachments and exhibits appended thereto (hereinafter, Second Addendum) (#31928, p. 3175) in
the district court. The Second Addendum sought to have the district court review several (but not
all) of the claims previously unpresented to any court, as well as to provide additional factual
support for some claims which were properly before the court having been included in previous
filings.
Included within the Second Addendum (among other claims) was: Claim FF - Ineffective
Assistance of Trial Counsel (Failing to independently test bullets ... ); Claim GG - Prosecutorial
Misconduct (Failure to disclose Diagnostic Imaging Report & x-rays ... ); and Claim JJ Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel (Failure to argue jury instructions related to accomplice
instruction no. 33 ... ). Each of these claims was also included within Shackelford's pro se 2011
petition for post-conviction relief, for despite these claims having been raised in the Second
Addendum, they were never adjudicated in that the district court denied the Motion to File the
Second Addendum on March 10, 2005 (#31928, ppg. 3438 - 41 ), thus, res judicata does not
apply. Further, the only commonality between Claim C in the 2011- 2013 petition (#42182, p.
204) (Brief; Claim C) and that reviewed by this Court in State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 247
P.3d 582 (2010) (Shackelford I) regarding stomach content peer review notes is that both were
violations of due process of law as described by Brady. Such does not claim preclusion make.
The district court denied the Second Addendum motion ostensibly due to (appellant
paraphrases for clarity) the lateness of the hour of its filing. This despite counsels' notice to the
6

court that the data from the independent medical expert regarding the Diagnostic Imaging Report
and x-rays had not yet been finalized, and a request that the court withhold judgment on that
claim until the final report had been made available. 4 The court also denied a MOTION TO
RECONSIDER DENYING MOTION TO

FILE

SECOND ADDENDUM TO THIRD

AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF (#31928, ppg. 3444 - 55); a
MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL ORDER DENYING MOTION TO FILE SECOND
ADDENDUM TO THIRD AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
(#31928, p. 3456 - 61); (disregarded a) SUPPLEMENT TO PETITIONER'S MOTION TO
RECONSIDER ORDER DENYING THE MOTION TO FILE SECOND ADDENDUM TO
THIRD AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF (#31928, p. 3477); a
SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL TO MOTION TO RECONSIDER ORDER DENYING MOTION
TO FILE SECOND ADDENDUM TO THIRD AMENDED PETITION

FOR POST-

CONVICTION RELIEF (#31928, p. 3557); and a THIRD SUPPLEMENT TO MOTION TO
RECONSIDER ORDER DENYING MOTION TO FILE SECOND ADDENDUM TO THIRD
AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF (#31928, p. 3671).
The affidavit of independent medical expert [radiologist] Dr. Roderick Saxey, MD, along
with the x-rays attached thereto (#4233 I, ppg. 224-25) reaffirms and supports Shackelford's
original and continuous claims of actual innocence in the First Degree (premeditated) Murder
convictions of both victims, as well as the count of Conspiracy to Commit First Degree

4 These reports & x-rays form the basis of the Brady/Giglio violations Shackelford set forth in
the 2011-2013 amended petition for post-conviction relief. The report/affidavit received from
the medical expert was received after the court's Memorandum Decisions on April 8, 2005,
and placed in the record on May 16, 2005 as a supplement. (#31928, p. 368 I). It was later
attached to the 2011-2013 post-conviction petitions as Exhibit A (#42331, ppg. 148-149);
(#42331, ppg. 224-25).
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(premeditated) Murder. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 115 S.Ct. 851 (1995); Dretke v. Haley, 541
U.S. 386, 124 S.Ct. 1847 (2004). Shackelford specifically asserts his actual innocence herein as
well.
Jurisdictional Question

The state continues to argue that the claims delineated as A, B, C & D within the prose
Appellant's (2011-2013) supplemental application for post-conviction relief (Latah County Case
No. CV-2001-4272) are barred by res judicata (claim preclusion) or alternatively, collateral

estoppel (issue preclusion). Brief of Respondent, pg. 12.
As recognized by the state, this Court has set forth three (3) separate and distinct
requirements of a res judicata I collateral estoppel bar to a subsequent action (subject to
sufficient reason exceptions); (1) same parties; (2) same claim and; (3) final judgment.Andrus v.

Nicholson, 145 Idaho 774, 186 P.3d 630 (2008); Taylor v. Riley, et. al., 157 Idaho 323, 336 P.3d
256 (2014), see also Johnson v. State, 158 Idaho 852, 353 P. 3d 1086 (Ct. App. 2015). It should
also be undisputed that without a valid final judgment having been entered by the district court in
Latah County Case No. CV2001-4272, every proceeding thereafter which relied upon the validity
of [that] final judgment would be null and void - including that of this Court in State v.

Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 24 7 P.3d 582 (2010) (Shackelford I). (Issue whether court has
exceeded its subject matter jurisdiction is never waived and purported judgments entered by that
court, acting without subject matter jurisdiction, are void and subject to collateral attack. State v.

Heyrend, 129 Idaho 568, 929 P.2d 744 (1996)). If this Court had no jurisdiction to hear
Shackelford I, then any claim presented within this [instant] appeal which are said to have been
ruled upon in Shackelford I can not be dismissed on the doctrine of res judicata. Additionally, as
8

this appeal would then be Shackelford's first appeal as a matter of right, collateral estoppel would
not apply either.
On April 8, 2005, the district court entered two (2) separate rulings - a MEMORANDUM
DECISION AND ORDER REGARDING THE STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS (#31928, ppg.
3586-3631)

and

a

MEMORANDUM

DECISION AND

ORDER REGARDING

THE

PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION (#31928, ppg. 3569-3985). Neither
of these memoranda in and of itself disposed of every claim before the district court. Even were
the memoranda combined, all claims properly before the court on post-conviction petition were
not adjudicated. Claims R, S and V were deemed moot by the district court, but made again
relevant by later rulings in Shackelford 1.5 and the district court failed to address fifteen (15) other
claims in the memoranda. 'The Petitioner correctly points out that [these] claims were not
specifically

addressed

in

this

court's

Memorandum

Decision.''

ORDER

DENYING

PETITIONER'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER ORDERS DENYING POST-CONVICTION
RELIEF, (#31928, pg. 3719).
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 54(b)(l) provides:
"When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third pmty claim, or when multiple pmties are
involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment upon one or more but
less than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that their
[sic] is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of the
judgment. In absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form
of decision, however designated, which adjudicates less than all the claims or the
rights and liabilities of less than all the parties shall not terminate the actions as to
any of the claims or parties ... "
5 Despite not ruling on these claims, the district comt did state in its memorandum: "However,
on remand, in an effort to guide counsel in their approach to sentencing, it appears in a capital
case that counsel have an independent obligation to prepare an adequate mitigation workup."
#31928, pg. 3611 (section R) (citation omitted). Thus it is clear that the district court would
have been required to grant (sentencing) relief on this claim alone.
9

" .. .In the event the trial court determines that a judgment should be certified as
final under this rule 54(b ), the court shall execute a certificate which shall
immediately follow the court's signature on the judgment and be in substantially
the following form ... " (form omitted).
Shackelford avers there was no valid final judgment, partial final judgment or Certificate
of Judgment (pursuant to IRCP 54(b)) entered by the district court in Latah County Case No.
CV2001-4272 until July 24, 2014, and that all claims presented within the March 14, 2011
petition for post-conviction relief (and amendments thereto authorized by the district court) were
supplemental to those claims within the active petition filed in 200 I. This averment is supported
by the fact(s) that the district court, not Shackelford, assigned the supplemental filing Case No.
CV2001-4272 rather than assigning a new case number as the court would have done had it been
a new (successive) petition for post-conviction relief. Further supporting this contention, as
ordered by the district court (Transcript - Hearing, March 08, 2004 #31928/27966, Tr., ppg. 290),
Shackelford waited less than one (I) week after the date he was no longer represented by counsel
to file the supplement. Shackelford also identified his filings as a Capital Case filings (#42331,
pg. 15 & pg. 18). In that Shackelford mailed his pro se claims literally hours after having been
notified he was no longer represented by counsel (per the district court's prohibition on filing pro

se documents, supra), no court could find that Shackelford did not assert his claims within a
reasonable time. Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 905, 174 P.3d 870, 875 (2007).

It is also interesting to note that the Chief of the Capital Litigation unit of the Idaho
Attorney General's Office can not dispute, or even explain away Shackelford's contentions:

"Additionally, for unknown reasons, Shackelford's successive petition was eventually given the
same case number as his first post-conviction case, Case No. CV-2001-00042. " (Brief of
Respondent, pg. 4, n. 2) and as shown in the Register of Actions for Latah County Case No.
10

CV200l-4272, there were no less than fifty (50) entries in the case between April 5, 2005 and
March 18, 2011, directly related to the ongoing post-conviction relief petition, with nearly
ninety (90) entries overall.
A post-conviction relief applicant must file an amended application when he or she desires
to raise additional issues in a post-conviction case. I.C.§ 19-4906(b); Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho
681, 978 P.2d 241 (1999). Shackelford did just that - filed an amended application in a pending
post-conviction proceeding within which no final judgment had been entered.
Latah County Case No. CV2001-4272 was not final (as this Court itself stated in its

Order Remanding to District Court For Final Judgment; "It appears that a final judgment

has yet to be entered by the district court in compliance with J.R. C.P. 54(a) ". (#42331) from the
time of its original filing in 200 I until July 24, 20 I 5 6 • It is left up to this court to decide whether
or not it had jurisdiction to even hear Shackelford I, for if not, then certainly none of the claims
can be excluded under the doctrine of resjudicata or collateral estoppel.
The record in this matter is clear; the district court did not enter a valid final judgment in
Latah County Case No. CV2001-4272 until July 24, 2014. Shackelford filed his December, 2001
and his March 2011 petitions for post-conviction relief (and authorized amendments) at a time
when he had a right to appointment of counsel pursuant to I.C.R. 44.2 in that the state did not file
its Notice that it would not seek the death penalty until June, 2011 (#39398, ppg. 14-20).

6 At the time of this Court's order dated July 24, 2015 (and the final judgment entered by the
district court the same day), this Court had not yet issued its FINALITY OF JUDGMENTS
(ENTERED PRIOR TO APRIL 15, 2015) order, thus the (finality) order was not applicable to
any issues in Latah County Case No. CV2001-4272 in that the district court had already entered
its final judgment prior to the entry of that order.
11

A record is constituted of proper and legitimate elements set down in their order; for it is
certainly not the law that all the gossip a clerk or prothonotary writes down in his docket, ipso

facto becomes the voice of undeniable truth. State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 348 P.3d 1, 61
(2015) (quoting State v. Rodriguez, 93 Idaho 286, 460 P.2d 711 ( 1969), Ball v. United States, 140
U.S. 118, 11 S.Ct. 761,765 (1891)).

WHEREFORE, Shackelford respectfully requests this Court to review all claims
presented within the Initial Brief of Appellant on their merits, and afford the pro se appellant
lenity when considering whether claims and arguments were artfully or skillfully presented.
Shackelford further requests this Court to remand this case back to the district court with
instructions to appoint counsel on post-conviction relief, to allow amendment(s) to said petition,
and to rule on the merits thereof Alternatively, Shackelford requests this Court to find that it did
not have jurisdiction to hear Shackelford I, remand the case to the district court with instructions
to allow a successive petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to I.C.§19-4901 et. seq., and
effectively reset the clock on all proceedings to April 8, 2005.

12
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I certify by my signature below that I have mailed (served) a true and correct copy of the foregoing
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF upon the Respondent by mailing same, postage pre-paid, to:

L. LaMont Anderson
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Capital Litigation Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83 720

Dale Carter Shackelford
#64613 /ISCC
P.O. Box 70010
Boise, ID 83 707
Appellant, pro se
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